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After a decade of economic transition in Russia there is still no theoretic analysis which
coherently interprets of it. Various analytic approaches have been tried. The ones that
stand out as important are those which have stemmed from a neoclassic (orthodox) point
of view. According to these studies, the destruction of the traditional institutions related
to central planning guarantees the appearance of a market economy. This destruction
permits economic agents to interact freely, generating what is known as an economic
market (Aslund 1995; Blanchard 1997; Lipton and Sachs 1990). Nevertheless, this focus
has presented serious limitations in explaining the difficulties of extending and consoli-
dating reforms and, therefore, their positive results.1 Attempts have been made to
explain a part of the problems that have appeared by considering certain political factors
such as corruption (Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 1994). Nevertheless, such
considerations have not succeeded in resolving the problems of the orthodox focus.
The neoclassic focus has been answered by evolutionist analysis, but frequently the
latter has been characterized more as a criticism of the orthodox conception than as a
perception of any new and specific ways to tackle this economic phenomenon. It is
appropriate to note, however, that evolutionary economists have suggested some analy-
sis of a global character (Murrell 1992a and 1992b; Koslowski 1992). In certain cases
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more novel approaches have been tried, changing the analysis hypothesis (Schlack
1996) or showing other economic visions of the transition, especially those of the
Schumpeterian type (Kuznetsov 1992; Egidi 1996).
The explicative problems of the orthodox approach, as well the limitations of alter-
native visions, have left a very important theoretical vacuum with respect to the analysis
of the economic transition in Eastern and Central Europe (March and Sánchez 1999a).
In this article we will attempt to fill this analytic vacuum. It is assumed that a deepening
of the understanding of the economic transition can not simply make clear that the pri-
vate interests of the economic parties, together with an absence of intervention by the
state, constitute sufficient conditions for the emergence of an economic market but
instead must highlight the institutional dimension of the process. That is to say, it is nat-
ural that analytic approaches be employed when a more in-depth view of the economic
market is required. A first step may be to assume that the market is an organized and
institutionalized exchange (Hodgson 1988, 174). However, carrying out a specific analy-
sis of the transition ends up being excessively generic and imprecise.
In this article the above subject will be expanded upon using the institutional con-
ception provided by Karl Polanyi. The contents of this paper will be broken into two
parts. First, Polanyi’s main ideas will be expounded in regard to his interest in analyzing
the transition (in England). These ideas will be adapted to the object of study and then
specified so that they will be efficient criteria for analyzing the present economic transi-
tion. Second, the results obtained will be applied to the Russian case, and an attempt
will be made to draw some conclusions about whether Russia is moving toward a market
economy.
Polanyi Institutionalism and the Transition Toward a Market Economy
Although several distinct parts of the work of Polanyi may be of great interest in
analyzing the transition process that is occurring in countries that until the 1990s were
organized by central planning, in this paper only the aspects which are most closely
related to the construction of market economies will be mentioned. According to
Polanyi, the commercialization of productive factors and money are among the deter-
mining elements for the construction of an economic market. With respect to the con-
cept of commercialization, it is necessary to point out a few details. First, in real
commercialization it is necessary that the productive factors (and the money) be “free”
to be bought and sold; this is a prerequisite so that agents are able to pursue profits
through exchange. With respect to such “liberty,” it should be noted, on one hand, that
it should not take place sporadically but continuously (social institution) (Stanfield
1980, 596) and, on the other hand, that the exchange relations should be determined
and relegated to a separate level from all other social relations. A second clarification is
that exchange relations should cover the productive factors that are essential in the pro-
cess of social reproduction. In particular, Polanyi emphasized the case of labor, but also
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that of land, given its relevance with respect to his object of study, the transition of Eng-
land toward a market economy. Polanyi also paid special attention to the changes that
money experienced as a strategic extension mechanism in international market rela-
tions and as a mechanism of integration in national markets.
Under these conditions, Polanyi noted that the system of institutions that consti-
tute a market economy functions when the exchange relations are generalized and come
to be dominant, determining the logical and dynamic functioning of the land, its labor,
and its money (Polanyi 1957a). Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the domination of
exchange relations within the society appears to be determined by the role that the rest
of the social relations play as well as by the existence of an explicit political willingness
on the part of the state that directs its attention toward such a transformation.
Following the theoretical provisions of Polanyi (March and Sánchez 1999b), it is
understood that after destroying the organizational and institutional structure that sup-
ported central planning there is no reason for the market to spontaneously emerge. In a
context where exchange relations occupy a secondary position within the organization
of the society, determining the behavior of the economic agents in a secondary manner,
it is unjust to adopt the hypothesis that the mere destruction of part of the existing insti-
tutional framework of the centrally planned economies would convert market relations
into a dominating force. In effect, the breakup of the organizational structure of the cen-
tral planning system led to an increase in the decentralized relations between economic
agents. But it is difficult to immediately assume that such relations would be definite in
their central nucleus because of the exchange through which the social agents would try
to obtain a monetary profit.
All things considered, while from the orthodox point of view decentralization and
exchange relations are identified with one another, Polanyi’s approach permits the
introduction of additional elements that distinguish them from each other. So the theo-
retical contributions of Polanyi, especially the references to the different principles of
social organization (forms of integration) and to the non-spontaneity of the domination
of the exchange relations over all else in the society, provide new analytic dimensions to
explain the processes of economic transition.2
Even though Polanyi’s institutional ideas can generally be applied in the explana-
tion of the transition of economies with central planning, an in-depth analysis of the
economic phenomenon requires an adaptation and specification of the ideas of this
author. With respect to the first, the essential factors that must be present to evaluate
the transition to a market economy refer to the extension of exchange relations to cer-
tain essential elements of the society causing this economy to function and reproduce,
that is to say, an extension to those elements that define the production process: land,
work, and the means of production. It should be mentioned that due to Polanyi’s analy-
sis objective, the construction of a market economy in England, the productive factors
that he attached more importance to were the first two (Polanyi 1957a; 1977, 10–11).
Due to the change in the object of study to that of economic transition, the means of
production will be considered explicitly.
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On the other hand, according to Polanyi another factor, money, must be added.3 In
particular, money must permit the generalized convertibility between the different pro-
ductive factors, that is, it must create the foundation that allows the extension of
exchange relations. These requirements are manifested when money has an associated
price, that is to say, a type of interest. In this context a commercialization of money can
be spoken of (Polanyi 1957a, 69).
So, then, the challenges of transition toward a market economy in the societies
organized by central planning can be synthesized using the institutional ideas of Polanyi
in both realms. In the first place, the productive factors (land, labor, and means of pro-
duction) must be “liberated” in such a way as to make them exchangeable. As Polanyi
himself affirmed, “all factors involved must be on sale, that is, they must be available in
the needed quantities to anybody who is prepared to pay for them” (1957a, 41). In the
second place, money must be commercialized in order to make a generalization about
the exchangeability of the productive factors.4
The ideas put forward up to this point allow some criteria to be established for the
analysis of transition toward a market economy. Nevertheless, as has been indicated
above, a more in-depth study of this phenomenon requires providing these forenamed
criteria with specific content. With respect to the transformation of land into a com-
modity, this supposes the possibility of its free exchange so that it might be mobilized to
obtain a profit linked to its exploitation. The construction of a market economy
requires the privatization of land ownership so that the rights of private ownership are
extended over it. For full commercialization of land it is also necessary to liberalize its
use, fully disposing of the production generated by its owner, at the same time permit-
ting the full transmission of land ownership rights, among possible buyers (buying-sell-
ing) and between different generations (inheritance). The limits of privatization or
property rights present obstacles to the transformation of land into a commodity. Dur-
ing the Soviet period special attention was paid to state control of the agrarian sector.
This was manifested in the intense collectivization of the 1930s. The only possibilities
for non-state-owned property appeared in the form of individually used parcels that the
rural population, and less extensively the urban population, were permitted to manage.
The production so obtained was intended for self-consumption but, in certain cases,
was sold, although not in a regular manner. That is, the exchange relations associated
with land during the Soviet period, when they existed, were very marginal.
As for the commercialization of labor, it involves the dependency on a monetary
wage linked to the performance of a job within the productive apparatus. The extension
of exchange relations to labor supposes its full attribution to the productive field, with
potentially full geographical and functional mobility, and its major dependence upon,
or total respect for, the income generated from its productive activity (wages). In this
sense, during the period of central planning, a process of industrialization took place
that very closely linked the population to the productive activity of the society. Never-
theless, even though the workers were paid monetary incomes (wages), the majority of
their compensation was in kind and not directly linked to their specific productive activ-
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ity (allocation of housing, social and community services, and so on). So, then, the com-
mercialization of labor requires the elimination of incomes parallel to those obtained by
direct participation in the productive apparatus since these incomes limit the necessity
of orienting work toward sale.
Regarding the means of production, as with land, its transformation into a com-
modity meant the privatization of the productive units that produced them (firms), the
possibility of acquiring the means of production, and the full availability of its use by the
owner. Nevertheless, with respect to the means of production two areas of discussion
must be distinguished: first, those related to their own means of generated production
(for example, investment goods) and, second, those linked to the production plants that
produce the latter. With respect to the first area, institutionalization of the buying-sell-
ing of the means of production must exist. As for the second field, the regulation of the
flow of production is very important, through the evaluation of the economic profitabil-
ity/viability of the activities that are being performed. This last aspect refers to the elimi-
nation of the nonproductive activities that appear regulated by the application of
bankruptcy legislation. The consolidation of a market economy leads to the appearance
and extension of a securities market through which an evaluation is performed comple-
mentary to the aforementioned one concerning the profitability/viability of production
plants. This entire process of evaluation of the means of plants and production is car-
ried out through the establishment of a financial system and, in particular, by way of the
development of a banking system. These elements permit resources to be liberated and
put in a situation of commercializable supply and demand while at the same time estab-
lishing the prices at which the exchanges will be performed. During the time of central
planning the objectives of production and distribution, as well as the setting of prices,
were decided by administrative entities outside the enterprise in such a way that its prof-
its had practically no relevance. Therefore, the relations that firms had with one another
and with the public could at no time be qualified as commercial exchange according to
the conception of Polanyi.
In the last place we have the commercialization of currency. According to Polanyi,
“we are familiar with the manner in which trade, the use of money and market elements
are integrated under a market system. The manner of integration, however, in the
absence of a dominant market system is obscure” (1969, 191). If productive factors are
not commercialized the existence of a market system is inconceivable and, in a situation
such as this, money doesn’t assume its own role in a market economy. With respect to
this, Polanyi indicated that in modern societies the distinction between the different
uses of currency does not possess a practical interest. Nevertheless, for the analysis of the
Russian transition, it can be useful to refer to some of the typical lists of the functions of
money, since its contrast with the Russian reality allows one to more clearly appreciate
the non-commercialization of the currency. In short, money can carry out, at least, four
types of functions: form of payment, standard of value, store of wealth, and means of
exchange (Polanyi 1977, 102–109). These functions have appeared separately in cen-
trally planned economies because the currency has played the part of ratification of pre-
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viously established administrative decisions. In the first place, production objectives
and supply plans were given to the firms, and their production was assigned. In the sec-
ond place, in accordance with the production plan, they were allocated some funds
whose destination, regarding the supplier and the acquired input, appeared preset, with
no changes being possible in this respect. Therefore, the currency served neither as a
widespread form of payment nor of exchange. An extreme case of this inconvertibility
appeared regarding inter-firm transactions that were carried out with bank transfers
(not convertible into cash), while the transactions between firms and workers were car-
ried out using cash (Dembinski, 1988). On the other hand, when completing the plan,
the benefits (or losses) of the firms were absorbed by the state administration, with
money not serving as a mechanism of accumulation; that is to say, the currency didn’t
serve the function of accumulation of wealth for the firms. It should also be pointed out
that in terms of the administrative level of planning, the type of units considered was dif-
ferent, so that the currency didn’t carry out the function of unified countable unit. In
short, until the currency is able to, at least, simultaneously assume these functions, it
will not be able to acquire the character of all-purpose money (Polanyi 1957b, 264), an
essential element to make possible the transition from markets toward self-regulating
market systems.
The construction of a market economy means that the productive factors are regu-
lated by exchange relations, that is to say, not only are land, means of production, and
labor transformed into commodities but also money itself. When this process of com-
mercialization reaches its peak and reproduces itself, it may be said that a market econ-
omy in countries in transition has been established. The commercialization of
productive factors (and of money) determines the behavior of agents and, because of
this, is transformed into the essential institution of a market economy.
The Economic Transition in Russia
The commercialization of land in Russia has its roots in the privatization process.5
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union adopted certain legislation during the last years
of its existence that permitted the development of some nuclei of private agriculture in
rural areas of Russia (Tyagunenko 1993), it was in 1991 that important legislation was
approved. In December, a presidential decree was approved that allowed the restructur-
ing of Soviet collective farms in joint-stock firms. In the restructuring process the possi-
bility of transferring parcels to the members of the collective farms was considered,
making these members the new owners of private property. In 1992, after the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the Land Code was approved. It consolidated the privatization leg-
islation issued up to that time, but it should be pointed out that at the end of that same
year the sale and purchase of land was approved by the Parliament, although with tem-
porary limitations and with very severe restrictions about the purchaser of the sold land.
In 1993, a government resolution was approved whereby the specific norms were con-
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sidered to execute the sales and purchases of land approved the previous year. This land
privatization legislation was consolidated institutionally in the approval of two essential
legal documents: in December 1993, the Russian Constitution and, in October 1994,
the Civil Code (Prosterman, Rolfes, and Mitchell 1995, 175–178).6 With this legisla-
tion as a backdrop until the end of 1994, each collective farm decided, in a council
made up of all its members, how it would be reorganized and what type of property it
would become. Each member of the farm was able to decide whether he would remain
in the collective farm, in which case his corresponding portion of land became the prop-
erty of the community. On the contrary, he could choose to leave the farm, having the
option of receiving his parcel of land or monetary compensation, depending on the
decision of each respective farm (Wegren 1998).
The restructuring in the agrarian sector resulted in a privatization of the collective
and state farms, which were transformed into corporations. Nonetheless, actual
changes in management, organization, or use of the property did not take place at all. It
may be pointed out that within this economic sector there appeared private farmers who
could make up the nucleus of a possible commercialization of land. However, this con-
sideration appears questionable because of the reduced number of farmers, the small
amount and low quality of land available, and also its small productive impact on the
whole of the sector (Wegren 2000). On the other hand, the transfer of property owned
by private firms presented problems. First, in the case of the owners wanting to transfer
the land, the mother-farm has the first option of acquiring it. Second, in the case of the
owner being someone who is not from the area, special permission is required. Third,
the use of the land can not be altered. In addition, the mother-farm has the right to
repossess the parcel if it is not used during the period of one year (Prosterman, Rolfes,
and Mitchell 1995).
Another noteworthy part of the reorganization was the distribution of small parcels
of land to the urban population (near the cities). Even though this type of family use
existed during the Soviet era, beginning in 1990 it became more common and each per-
son who lived in a city could obtain such a parcel for the production of agricultural
products for personal consumption. Specifically, in each region a land bank was formed
to be divided in this way, even though its non-agrarian use was limited, while at the same
time additional restrictions were introduced related to the agrarian experience and edu-
cation of the recipient. In the same sense, the possibility of buying and selling these par-
cels by city residents was established, although also restricted to agrarian applications
(Wegren 1998). With respect to family use, in the first half of the 1990s an important
phenomenon concerning the exchange of parcels took place, generally in the form of
bartering and without the aim of obtaining any monetary gains, given that the final
objective was to possess a parcel of land to produce food for personal, family
consumption.
So, then, land reform in rural Russia has created three agents: agrarian firms that
have inherited the old collective organization, private farmers, and personal family
farms. Nevertheless, in terms of production, the large agrarian firms are still the largest
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contributors to overall agrarian production, while private farms provide a very modest
quantity. The family farms are in a different situation because, although they are of prac-
tically insignificant size in terms of production, they provide substantial quantities of
those products essential for the maintenance of the family itself.
Therefore, with respect to agrarian land, although formally a certain commercial-
ization was generated, in practice the restriction to access, sale, and use of this land hin-
ders, from the start, its commercialization (Wegren 1997; Barnes 1998). Nonetheless,
demographic and sociocultural problems typical of the rural areas that show a rejection
of these abrupt changes and, specifically, of privatization must also be mentioned
(Wegren and Durgin 1997).7 That is to say, the intervention of the state has prevented
the market from becoming self-regulating, and it has maintained part of the bureau-
cratic regulations coming from the Soviet period.
With regard to the commercialization of labor, the existence of wages and the
dependence of the population on their work are a legacy from the industrial society cre-
ated during the Soviet period. With respect to this, it should be clarified that at that
time the connection between the meeting of essential needs and wages was almost non-
existent, given that the majority of these needs were met by the state. During the transi-
tion period the population’s dependency on this official wage has continued to be very
limited. Even though the workforce receives an official wage, it should be noted that
there is a very big difference between monetary and non-monetary incomes. Besides the
primary wage, monetary income is often present from the performance of a second job,
as well as from sporadic work (Sanchez 1997).
Therefore, at first glance one can affirm that a wage exists, which you can identify as
the price of manpower. However, a deeper analysis of the economic situation during the
transition questions this statement. In the first place, a weak correlation exists between
variations in employment and variations in production and, at the same time, exactly
the same thing happens between the latter and variations in wages. That is to say, wages
are not a mobilizing element of the productive work factor. To this type of consider-
ation it is necessary to add, on one hand, that the reduction in employment is a result of
the decisions made by the workers themselves and, on the other hand, that one cannot
affirm that geographical barriers in Russia are any harder to overcome than those of
developed capitalist countries. That is to say, it cannot be argued that these last two ele-
ments are obstacles that impede the use of wages as the price that mobilizes manpower.
On the other hand, the great variation in wages should be pointed out. Wages are not
related to levels of productivity and qualification degrees but linked to historical tradi-
tions and depending on sectorial factors, elements that further detach wages from their
identification as prices of productive factors (Clarke 1999, 37–46).
Moreover, the population has the benefit of all of the social infrastructure created
during the Soviet period, which, even though partially deteriorated, provides essential
support. In fact, this infrastructure can be considered as an income in kind for being
Russian. Within this infrastructure it should be noted that housing is provided at
almost no cost, community services are subsidized and sometimes even free (telephone
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service, electricity, running water, hot water, and heating), or social services are pro-
vided (health care and education) (Commander and Jackman 1997; OECD 1995).
These factors acquire more relevance insofar as the old productive units, state owned as
well as private, continue reproducing the influence of the Soviet model of behavior.
This model guarantees certain social services to the workers and to their respective fami-
lies. As has been noted earlier, from the beginning of the 1990s the population has gen-
erally been supplied with a parcel of land which is cultivated during the summer months
and which provides the family with an important part of its essential food goods. In the
absence of this type of parcel, food products such as these are frequently obtained
through close relations that are maintained with relatives who live in rural areas.
These aspects reveal how little workers depend on their wages (which is an indica-
tor of the low level of labor commercialization), a situation that is reflected in the fact
that even though there are frequent and extended delays in paying wages, and also fail-
ure to pay wages, this does not have great relevance to the survival of the workers in gen-
eral (Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquiti 1999). Even members of the new private
sector, where there is a greater dependence on wages and where access to complimen-
tary services is reduced or does not exist (Clarke and Borisov, 1999; Clarke and
Kabalina 2000), are not prevented from having at their disposal, in part, the social ser-
vices and infrastructures as a direct inheritance from the Soviet period or because they
obtain such benefits through relatives.
In short, the labor relationships during the transition appear to be strongly influ-
enced by the Soviet legacy. For Soviet workers, wages did not guarantee their survival;
the state and the firm covered an important part of their necessities; production for
self-consumption in the dacha and, even, hunting and gathering in forests supple-
mented the inadequacies of the state provision; and, lastly, family and local relation-
ships constituted a third provisioning environment in which relationships of reciprocity
and of exchange prevailed. A good many of these mechanisms remain in effect at the
present, and they limit the wage dependence of the workers. That is to say, the persis-
tence of inherited relationships of redistribution and reciprocity discourage the sale of
the workforce in the market. Nevertheless, a relative commercialization exists in this
environment: second jobs, which are compensated at a freely agreed upon price,
although they are only supplemental in nature.
The privatization of state property has created the foundation for the commercial-
ization of the means of production. This transformation has taken place in two stages,
the first from 1992 to 1993 (characterized by limits to privatization) and the second after
1994 (in which money was used as a mechanism to acquire property), producing a mas-
sive privatization of firms (means of production). Since that time, firms have had the lib-
erty to make decisions regarding supplies, technology, and production. Profit making
has also come to occupy an important place in the survival of the firm (Bornstein 1994;
Linz and Krueger 1998).
In spite of the fact that in the beginning all the means of production can be
acquired with money and administrative orders existed as a condition sine qua non are
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no longer required for the mobilization of these resources, it must be pointed out that in
practice such commercialization is incomplete. Specifically, the immense volume of
unpaid debts between businesses, the cancellation of debts by way of payment in kind,
or the extension of barter brings into question commercial exchange relations as deter-
minants of what happens to the means of production. That is, depending on the situa-
tion, the form of payment, or the client, a means of production has one price or
another, in addition to the fact that the transmission of the means of production can be
founded in relations that are not connected to the exchange. Additionally, for the calcu-
lation of prices the inability to define the costs of production brings into question the
very foundation of the formation of prices for the means of production (Commander
and Munssen 1998). In reality, as much in the formation of costs as in the determina-
tion of retail prices, both economic factors and, especially, non-economic factors are
influential. Therefore, we do not agree that a strict transformation of the means of pro-
duction exists.8
This partial commercialization of the means of production was complemented by
the adoption of a bankruptcy law, the creation of a stock exchange, and reinforcement
in the design of a banking system fashioned after the western model. Bankruptcy law
should be used as an indicator of how effectively firms are excluded which are not of
value within the exchange relations, that is to say, those without the characteristics of
commodities. In the new capital market a portion of the firms with a higher degree of
commercialization would enter. This would create a reference point for the rest of the
productive units. That is, the stock market constitutes a symbol of the consolidation of
exchange relations as determinants within the society. The banking system would
become consolidated as a control mechanism of the firms, especially through the grant-
ing of loans that would regulate the real activity of the economy. It must be pointed out
that banks could also influence firms’ activities through the control of their ownership.
Massive privatization has not meant that the firms’ activities (means of production)
are strictly guided by exchange relations. In fact, the largest volume of managerial flows
appears determined by exchange in kind, monetary compensation, accumulation of
unpaid debts, maintaining of economic relations determined by the firms’ historical tra-
jectories, and so on (Poser 1998a). That is to say, the functioning and relations between
firms depend not so much on the exchange relations founded on the obtaining of mon-
etary profits but rather on other types of connections whose foundations are solidarity,
cooperation, and so on. It may be pointed out that the large size of the firms and the
dependency of the social infrastructure, and even of the very cities, on the firms deter-
mine their privatization, as well as that of the infrastructures or of the land itself (OECD
1997).
Bankruptcy laws have not had perceivable effects so far. Therefore, firms that gener-
ate production without market value have not obtained income but continue to exist,
even though in many of these cases part of the production has been reduced and their
debts with respect to other firms have increased. With respect to capital markets, they
have been presented in segmented form (divided by sectors, regions, and even economic
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activities), in such a way that they have not formed a reference point for the evaluation
of the commercialization of firms and have remained, almost exclusively, within the
realm of speculation, unrelated to the country’s actual economy. With regard to the
banking sector, its involvement in the productive sector has been very small, and its
credit activities have been based on speculation (Johnson 1994; OECD 1997). This last
factor has worsened due to the state’s demonstrated inability to control banking activi-
ties, which has been manifested in the periodic appearance of serious banking crises
(Buchs 1999).
Together with the above limitations related to the commercialization of the means
of production appears the absence of monetization of the economy. This problem is
manifested, essentially, in three forms: unpaid debts, barter, and the issuance of promis-
sory notes (veksels). The generalized unpaid debts in the Russian economy appeared dur-
ing the very beginning of the transition (Ickes and Ryterman 1993), destroying the
foundation of commercial exchange relations. Subsequently, they adopted other forms
such as postponement of payment and then, as the quantities were not indexed, the
inflationary process “unpaid” de facto part of the debts. The impossibility of paying with
money has led to the extension of payments in kind or barter.
Barter involves the direct exchange of a diverse array of goods, such activity appear-
ing to be based on the value of use itself that is assigned to the product that is the object
of exchange. It is estimated that in 1992 bartering constituted 6 percent of commercial
operations, while in 1997 it represented 41 percent and appeared to be increasing
(Aukutsionek 1998a; Shlapentokh 1997, 873). Initially barter took on a simple form
with the firms acquiring the goods they needed directly. However, the extension of this
type of phenomenon has transformed it into something more complex. Specifically,
some systems of multiple compensation (clearing) between groups of firms have been
established that have granted the mechanism a greater fluidity (Yakovlyev 1998;
Aukutsionek 1998b). In spite of being transformed into a more complex part of the bar-
ter system, it has not lost its essence: the search for the value of use rather than that of
exchange. Additionally, the establishment of barter determined the relations between
the distinct participating agents, given that some were excluded (for example, because
their production was thought to be of little use to potential clients) while certain pro-
ductive activities were favored over others in terms of the possibilities that the barter
itself presented. On the whole, barter activities have damaged the relations between the
different economic agents and have become an obstacle to the formation of prices. In
this way, the transmission of information concerning the quantity and quality of the
products exchanged has been hindered and, therefore, the extension of competition
between participating agents has been obstructed (Poser 1998b, 162–163).
A more sophisticated way of favoring the relations firms have with each other, the
public, or state institutions has been the issuance of promissory notes as an alternative
to the use of money in the performance of exchanges and the cancellation of debts. This
type of financial instrument has been employed as much by firms as by regional state
institutions. It is estimated that more than 25 per cent of the commercial transactions in
Market Institutions in Russia: View from Institutionalism of Polanyi 11
Russia rely to some extent on promissory notes. On the other hand, no generalized rec-
ognition of such financial instruments exists, while at the same time no equivalent exists
for them. Therefore, the generalization of this type of financial instrument has impeded
the creation of a single financial space in Russia and made impossible the establishment
of an integrated realm for conducting homogenous dealings, the foundation of the
exchange relations that support the market as an institution.
The three cases shown are leading to the failure of the ruble to acquire the rank of
all-purpose money because it does not unify the four essential functions of a currency as
a commodity. The massive use of barter shows that the ruble is only utilized in a mar-
ginal way as a mechanism for the cancellation of debts (means of payment). On the
other hand, the issuance of promissory notes generates a multitude of means of
exchange whose validity depends, at least, upon the regional environment, the type of
clients, and the issuing institution, as well as the kind of transaction that is being per-
formed. That is, the ruble does not fulfill, more than partially, the function of a means
of exchange. With regard to money as a standard of value, even though at first the ruble
was employed as a countable mechanism, the widespread use of barter and promissory
notes will change the final outcome of its countability. Finally, the ruble fulfills the func-
tion of storage of wealth in a residual manner, due to elevated inflation but also, espe-
cially, due to its limited use in commercial transactions. At the same time, the use of
promissory notes and other goods does not fulfill this function either, since they have a
very short life. Additionally, the ruble’s problems with becoming an all-purpose money
are worsened by the high degree of dollarization in the economy (Brodsky 1997), which
occupies the limited space where the Russian currency gives support to exchange
relations.
Conclusion
Through the institutionalism of Polanyi it can be deduced that one of the limits to
constructing a market economy in Russia may appear related to the difficulty of trans-
forming diverse productive factors—specifically land, means of production, labor, and
money—into commodities. In this sense, the separation of institutions formerly linked
to central planning does not imply the spontaneous commercialization of these factors
and, therefore, it does not mean the appearance of a new productive process mediated
by exchange relations.
In Russia decision making has been decentralized, although it can not be affirmed
that exchange relations (market institutions) organize the functioning of productive fac-
tors. Rather than being transformed into a dominant feature, exchange relations (mar-
ket institutions) now constitute one of the many relations that determine the behavior
of economic agents in Russia. Specifically, the degree of commercialization of the pro-
ductive factors is still residual, and money does not constitute, in practice, a mobilizing
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element of productive resources. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the Russian case
the essential functioning mechanism of a market economy has not been introduced.
During the transition process an aggregate of social relations is forming in which
those involving exchange carry out a role that is complementary to the rest of the rela-
tions (reciprocity and redistribution). In this context, the framework of social and insti-
tutional relations that has been emerging does not guarantee that the Russian economy
will effectively transform into a market economy. Therefore, a question mark appears
concerning future Russian economic trends as well as a great uncertainty about the
direction the transition process will take in this country.
Notes
1. Specifically, these reforms should lead to economic stabilization and growth. However, the
majority of the countries in transition have remained excluded from these economic benefits.
This has been justified by claiming that there has been insufficient economic liberalization.
Nevertheless, the question of why these reforms have not been applied has still not been
clearly answered (Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996).
2. The orthodox conception assumes that when economic decentralization takes place, the prin-
ciple of social integration is that of exchange. An important characteristic of the works of
Polanyi is the existence of other principles of social integration: reciprocity, redistribution,
and domestic administration. Regarding the latter, an important debate exists about its singu-
larity as an integration mechanism, on which Polanyi himself changed his position. Neverthe-
less, the objective of this work is not to discern what type of social integration exists in the
current Russian economy. In fact, having this other objective would mean being willing to
implicitly admit that such an integration exists. However, this consideration is not evident
and would require a separate study. With respect to this see the works of Polanyi himself
(1957a; 1977), as well as those of S. C. Humphreys (1969), William Schaniel and Walter
Neale (2000), or J. Ron Stanfield (1986, 65–79).
3. With regard to this type of aspect, it should be kept in mind that different positions exist con-
cerning the delimitation of money, means of production, and capital. An in-depth discussion
of this question is not necessary for the purpose of this paper, and the position of Neale is
adopted (1987, 1201).
4. It should be pointed out that these conditions become necessary but not sufficient in them-
selves to construct a market economy in a society in transition. In effect, the final result
depends not only on the establishment of some formal institutions but also on the combined
influence of informal institutions, that is to say, on the impact which the combination of the
rest of these social relations has on them (Neale 1991).
5. For a more in-depth explanation of current Russian reforms, see Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny
1995, Ernst, Alexeev, and Marer 1996, Gregory and Stuart 1998, Leitzel 1995, and Woodruff
1999.
6. In 1994 the Civil Code of the Russian Federation was passed. It recognizes the rights of the
owner to possess, use, and transfer ownership of his property (art. 209) and, especially, the
land owner’s right to sell, transfer, mortgage, or rent his parcels, even though it is clear that
the use of this land for non-agrarian applications is still not allowed (art. 260). Note that this
legislation requires the enforcement of complementary judicial norms to make these rights
truly effective, although at present they still have not been passed.
7. These factors refer to the existing informal norms as a basis for the willingness to put into
practice market institutions, as they define the latter. This type of phenomenon is especially
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visible in the case of the reforms applied to the ownership of agrarian land (Grossman 1997,
252).
8. In fact, the very incomplete commercialization of the means of production has led some
authors to affirm that the problem of Russia’s economy is that it destroys the added value
(Gaddy and Ickes 1998).
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